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External Debt and Exchange Rate Overshooting:
The Case of Selected East Asian Countries
Abstract:
The accumulations of foreign debts had indeed been at a rapid phase, particularly during 
the last few years leading to the outbreak of the 1997 financial crises in the four most 
severely effected economies, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Korea. 
Interestingly, during the same period, the rates of overshooting of these East Asian 
currencies have also been found to increase considerably. The objective of this paper is 
to evaluate whether the rapid accumulation of external debts, especially since 1994, has 
contributed to the overshooting of the East Asian countries’ currencies starting late 1997. 
KeyWords: External Debt, East Asian Countries, Exchange Rate and 
Overshooting.
JEL Classifications: F31, F34, F41.2
1. Introduction
Due to its widespread adverse implications on various parts of the economy, 
evaluating causes and determinants of exchange rate volatilities have accordingly 
remained one of the key research agenda for both academics and policy makers. A rise 
in exchange-rate volatilities has in general been found to have negative consequences 
on the trade sector (i.e. exports and imports) in the local economy (McKenzie (1999), 
Chou (2000), Rahmatsyah, Rajaguru and Siregar (2002), Siregar and Rajan (2004) and 
Clark, et.al (2004))
1. Based on Japan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) data at 
aggregated as well as disaggregated industry level, Kiyota and Urata (2004) find that 
large volatility in real exchange rate discourages FDI.  A seminal study by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) has also shown that the monetary authority needs to intervene and 
manage the fluctuation of the local currency in order to achieve its desire level of 
inflation target.  
Several attempts have been made recently to particularly examine the role of 
external debt/borrowing in explaining the fluctuations of the local currency. Corsetti et al. 
(1999) and Kawai (2002) have argued that external borrowings, particularly by private 
commercial banks and firms are among the key factors responsible for the severity of 
the East Asian financial and currency crises during the late 1990s. Providing a more in-
depth look at the features of currency crises, Cavallo, et.al. (2002) develop a model that 
suggests the size of foreign currency denominated debt of a country contributes to the 
occurrences of exchange rate overshooting, sudden stop of capital flows and output 
drop in the domestic economy. Cavallo (2005) further argues that the exposure to 
foreign currency liabilities magnify the cost of exchange rate depreciation. Likewise, 
   
1 It should be noted however, Clark, et.al (2004) have found evidences that there is no clear 
evidence of a negative effect of exchange rates on world trade at the aggregate level. However, 
once the study examines the data on the bilateral level, it finds in some cases that exchange rate 
volatilities adversely affect trade.  3
Devereux and Lane (2001) underline the need “to extend the list of variables important 
for understanding bilateral exchange rate volatility beyond those suggested by optimal 
currency area theory” (pp.27). Their study shows that for developing countries, in 
particular, volatility in their bilateral exchange rates is strongly and negatively affected by 
the stock of external debt. 
Supporting the findings of those early studies, Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) 
find that the high debt level was partly responsible for the high swings of the real 
exchange rate of the Argentine peso during the collapse of the currency board regime in 
that country in January 2002. Combining insights from the third-generation currency 
crisis models with simple trade theories, Menzies and Vines (2004) develop a model of 
exchange rate overshooting due to a debt service multiplier. 
However, most of the previous studies are largely theoretical, and hardly any of 
the above studies investigate the country-by-country case of the 1997 financial crisis-
effected East Asian economies. Cavallo, et.al. (2002) for instance evaluates the 
implication of external debt on the exchange rate overshooting on a pool of 23 countries 
(ranging from an African country to a number of European economies).  Given the cross-
country empirical approach, it is therefore impossible to draw inferences for each 
individual economy, and conduct comparative analyses between them.  
The objective of this paper is to try to understand and confirm the possible role of 
external/foreign debt in explaining the fluctuations of the local currencies of selected 
East Asian economies, namely, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea 
during the period of pre- and post-1997 East Asian financial and currency crisis. Looking 
at two key categories of the external debts of these countries gathered from the BIS debt 
database, namely, debt securities and total claims on commercial banks located in the 
domestic market, the accumulations of foreign debts since early 1990s had indeed been 4
at a rapid phase, particularly during the last few years leading to the outbreak of the 
1997 financial crises, and continued to be high several years after 1997 (Figures 1-4). 
During the same period, we also find episodes of significant nominal and real 
exchange rate overshooting (and undershooting) of these four East Asian currencies 
(the Indonesian rupiah, the Philippines peso, the Thai baht and the Korean won), 
particularly since the beginning of the 1997 financial crisis. We introduce a model which 
will explicitly define overshooting of the exchange rate when the spot (or the short-run) 
exchange rate of a currency depreciates (appreciates) against its trading partner’s 
currency at a percentage rate significantly more (less) than that of the long-run 
“equilibrium” exchange rate. In short, an overshooting situation occurs when the spot 
rate of the local currency has weakened further than the long-run fundamentally 
determined equilibrium rate, or the spot rate has not strengthened as strongly as the 
long-run equilibrium rate. The opposite circumstances are true for the undershooting 
cases.
2
Our paper hopes to extend early literatures by particularly addressing the 
following set of questions for the previously listed four East Asian currencies. Have the 
rapid accumulation of external debts contributed to the overshooting of the East Asian 
countries’ currencies in late 1990s and early 2000s? Have the rise in the average 
external debt share of GDP, especially starting 1995 and 1996, contributed to the more 
severe overshooting of the local currencies especially in late 1997 and early 1998 when 
compared to the rates reported during the pre-1997 financial crisis period? Which type of 
external liability, i.e. the debt security or the claims on bank, to be more responsible for 
the high overshooting in these economies?  
   
2 The definition of overshooting will be clarified further in the empirical section of the paper. A 
similar definition has also been used by Cavallo, et.al. (2002), where an overshooting is defined 
as any weakening in the local currency at the rate above and beyond the depreciation of the long-
run fundamental equilibrium exchange rate.   5
After providing background analyses on the trends of external debts and 
evidences of over and undershooting of these four economies in the next section of the 
paper, we adopt and extend the basic overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976 and 
1976b) in section 3. The reduced form of the model provides us with a testable 
hypothesis, suggesting the higher is the external debt the more severe is the 
overshooting. In section 4, data and empirical testing adopted and employed to estimate 
the size of the overshooting and the validity of the theoretical hypothesis found in section 
3. The findings for each of the four economies will also be discussed in that section. 
Brief concluding remarks end the paper. 
2. Trends and Analysis
2.1 External Debts of Selected East Asian Countries 
Dictated by the availability of the data, this study considers two major 
components of the external debt of the four East Asian economies according to BIS 
database, namely the total claims on banks and the total debt securities issued abroad 
by the individual countries (Figures 1-4).
3 The total claims on banks here are total bank’s 
liabilities to their foreign creditors. The debt securities include money market 
instruments, bonds, and notes issued in international markets by both public and private 
sector borrowers. On the following paragraphs, we will analyze the quarterly trends of 
these two forms of external debts, both with respect to their actual amounts and their 
GDP shares from early 1990s to last quarter of 2003. 
From 1994 to 1996, the total quarterly GDP shares of both categories of external 
debts for the four East Asian economies were rather moderate, ranging between 30 to 
50 percent. Within the period of less than two years, all four economies had rapidly 
   
3 Please refer to the following website: 
http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/debtauthenticate.asp6
accumulated external debt, reaching as low as 80 percent of the quarterly GDP for 
Thailand and as high as 140 percent of the quarterly GDP for the Philippines. 
The rapid increase in the claims on banks located in these four economies in 
mid-1990s reflected the strong and predominantly bank related capital inflows in the 
region. With the sudden stop of capital/investment flows and the collapse of key 
industries at the early stages of the 1997 financial crises, a large number of commercial 
banks experienced a rise in the proportion of the bad loans and eventually were no 
longer able to service their foreign currency denominated borrowings. 
A number of contrasting trends are worth highlighting from Figures 1-4. Looking 
at the case of Indonesia, the country has accumulated claims on bank at a relatively 
more rapid rate than that of the debt securities starting mid 1994 to early 1999. From first 
quarter of1994 to the third quarter of 1998, the total claims on bank have increased by 
more than US$3 billion (to about US$15 billion). The debt securities have also increased 
from a mere US$2 billion in early 1994 to about US$5.5 billion in the last quarter of1996.  
The total claims on bank and the debt securities were around 20 percent and 10 percent 
of the quarterly GDP in early 1997, respectively. By the second semester of 1998, the 
total claims on bank share of the quarterly GDP were close to 90 percent, more than 
doubled the amount of the debt securities.
In contrast, Korea and Thailand had amassed debt securities at a substantially 
much higher rate relative to the reported rate for claims on bank during the same period. 
During the first quarter 1997, Thailand had accumulated almost an equal percentage 
share of the quarterly GDP of these two categories of external debt at a rate slightly 
above 20 percent, or around US$ 10 billions. By late 1997, the debt securities share of 
the quarterly GDP was about 10 percent higher than the rate of the claims on banks, at 
around US$12 billions. A similar trend can also be reported for the case of Korea. By the 
second quarter of 1996, the two types of external debts in Korea were about the same 7
size (moderately over 20 percent of the quarterly GDP or around US$31 billion). By the 
last quarter of 1998, the debt securities reached around US$50.5 billions, and its share 
of the GDP for that quarter was more than 15 percent higher than that of the claims on 
banks. 
Towards the end of the 1990s to the start of the present decade, there is an 
observed declining trend in these two categories of external debts for Indonesia. The 
amount of debt securities category of external debt continued to fall from around US$6.5 
billion to around US$1.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2001, before increased 
moderately to around US$3 billion in last quarter of 2003. As for the country’s total 
external claims on bank, its total declined to about US$12 billion in late 2003 or around 
23 percent of the GDP for that quarter from its highest level of around US$15 billions in 
1998.
As for Korea, the total amounts of the two categories of the country external 
debts have more or less stabilized. In one side, the bank claims dropped moderately 
from US$46 billion in the first quarter of 1998 to around US$40 billion, or around 23 
percent of last quarter GDP in 2003. In contrast, the total debt securities raised to about 
US$56 billion (or around 33 percent of the quarterly GDP) by end 2003 from US$48 
billion in the first quarter of 1998. 
From its peak at around US$13.3 billions (or about 44 percent of the quarterly 
GDP) in the second quarter of 1999, the debt securities of Thailand have gradually 
declined to around US$9 billions, roughly around 22 percent of last quarter of GDP in 
2003. The claims on bank, on the other hand, continued to remain quite high. After 
reaching around US$15.5 billions in last quarter of 2001, the country’s total debt in this 
category declined gradually to reach around US$11.2 billion (34 percent of quarterly 
GDP) by the second quarter of 2002. However, between mid-2002 until end of 2003, the 8
total claims on the Thailand banks have increased rapidly and was reported to be close 
to US$18 billion, or around 45 percent of the last quarter GDP in 2003.   
Among the four countries examined in this paper, the Philippines has the long 
standing record of issuing debt securities on the international market, particularly since 
late 1996. The rate of accumulation of external debt in the form of debt securities grew 
from around 30 percent of (or about US$6.4 billions) of the first quarter 1997 GDP to 
over 100 percent, roughly around US$24 billions, of the last quarter GDP in 2003. In 
contrast, the claims on bank were reported at around the same size as the debt 
securities in the second quarter of 1997. It rose to about 80 percent of the first quarter 
GDP in 1999, and was gradually declining to around 40 percent of last quarter GDP in 
2003, roughly about US$9.5 billions.
2.2 Overshooting and Undershooting
As briefly mentioned before, an overshooting occurs when the short-run 
exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) more (less) than the long-run equilibrium 
exchange rate. For our analyses, we examine the overshooting incidences for both the 
nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) and the real effective exchange rates (REER) 
of the local currencies of the four East Asian economies against the countries’ top five 
trading partners’ currencies. Since neither the official long-run exchange rates nor the 
forward rates of these currencies are available, we have to construct our own estimates. 
The steps taken to generate the long run and the spot rates for the NEER and the REER 
will be discussed in more detail at the later part of the paper. The frequency and the 
severity of the overshooting and undershooting of these economies are shown in 
Figures (6b, 6d, 7b, 7d, 8b, 8d, 9b and 9d).   
Sharp contrasting evidences are reported for the pre- and post-1997 financial 
crisis periods. In general, the pre-crisis was a period of stability. The NEER of the 9
Korean won experienced almost no overshooting and undershooting. The Thailand baht 
had at the most only around 5 percent of overshooting and undershooting of the NEER. 
The Philippines peso and the Indonesian rupiah, on the other hand, had experienced 
double-digit rates of overshooting and undershooting as high as 14 percent and 10 
percent, respectively.
The post-1997 crisis period witnessed much more volatilities in both NEER and 
REER of these four major East Asian currencies. The NEER of the Indonesian rupiah 
and the Korean won experienced overshooting by as much as 70 percent and 80 
percent, respectively. The NEER of the peso, on the other hand, reported the most 
modest overshooting at only around 15 percent.
4 The baht overshot as much as around 
38 percent at the early stage of the 1997 financial crisis. Relatively similar analyses can 
be drawn from the trends of the REER for the pre- and post-1997 crisis periods, except 
that, in general, the rates are more moderate than the rates observed for NEER.
In addition to the magnitude, the frequency of the overshooting and 
undershooting incidences is another critical fact worth highlighting, particularly for the 
period immediately after the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis. Based on a simple step 
of observing the sequential periods of overshooting and undershooting at the minimum 
rate of 20 percent, the rupiah had undoubtedly experienced the longest sequential 
episodes of severe overshooting (and undershooting). Immediately after the initial 
meltdowns of the currencies in the third quarter of 1997, the rupiah continued to 
experience substantial over- and undershooting in all quarters of 1998, plus two 
additional quarters in mid to late 1999, with the quarterly average of over 30 percent. 
The Korean won and the Thai baht, on the other hand, had gone through only two 
quarters at the most of soaring overshooting and undershooting of more than 20 
   
4 Cavallo, et.al. (2002) report at the beginning of the 1997 financial crisis, the real effective 
exchange rate of the rupiah overshot by around 155 percent, the won by about 33 percent, the 
baht by about 36 percent and the peso by about 16 percent.10
percent. The Philippines, on the other hand, had reported a series of overshooting 
period, which is followed immediately by an undershooting episode. However, the 
average magnitude was less than 10 percent per quarter.   The relatively higher 
frequencies and larger magnitudes of overshooting (and undershooting) of the NEER 
and REER seem to suggest that the 1997 East Asian financial crisis had undoubtedly 
affected the Indonesian rupiah most severely. 
3. Theoretical Framework
As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, the main objective of this paper is 
to empirically examine the role of the external debt flows in explaining the incidences of 
overshooting (and undershooting) of the four East and Southeast Asian currencies. 
However, before any empirical testing can be conducted, it is imperative that we 
establish the relationship between those two variables theoretically. To construct the 
theoretical framework, we adopt and modify the basic framework of the Dornbusch 




Price reaction function is a simple Phillips Curve (Equation 1) without inflation 
expectations.
5 Here, we assume a stationary economy with no continuing inflation. Note: 
all key variables in this section are in log-form, unless it is otherwise noted. 
) ( y y p
d - =p & (1)
p & is domestic inflation ---or change in price over time. Note that price is sticky in the 
short-run (hence,  0 » p & ). 
d y is the aggregate demand for the goods in the domestic 
   
5 This is the same Philips curve equation adopted by Dornbusch (1976).11
economy .  y is the aggregate supply of goods locally produced (exogenously 
determined). p is a positive coefficient (p >0).
Equation (2) posits that the aggregate demand for the goods positively depends 
on the real exchange rate ) ( p e- (assuming foreign price equals to one (i.e. its log 
equals to zero)), income (aggregate supply), and household and government 
expenditures.
c y p e y
d + + - = 1 0 ) ( b b (2)
p is the domestic price level. e is the nominal exchange rate (a rise implies a 
depreciation of local currency). c is the total government and consumer spendings. It 
captures the time preference parameter, hence reflecting the social thrift in the economy. 
0 b and  1 b are positive coefficients. The demand for goods in the market is driven by the 
fluctuation of the real exchange rate (nominal exchange rate and domestic price), the 
supply of the goods, and the level of household and government expenditures. 
3.2. MoneyMarket
The demand for money in the local economy is captured by the following
equation (Equation (3)).
i y p m
d l f - + = (3)
d m represents the domestic demand for money. iis the domestic interest rate. f
denotes the income-elasticity of money demand, and f >0. (  0 > l ) is the interest-
elasticity of money demand.  Higher interest rate raises the opportunity cost of holding 
money, and therefore reduces the demand for money. An increase in the output, on the 
other hand, generates a rise in the transactions demand for money. Finally, the nominal 12
demand for money is positively proportional to the price level. As in the case of previous 
equations, all of these variables are in log-form.   
The money market equilibrium condition ensures that the demand for money is 
fully met by the supply. 
m m m
d s = = (4)
Where: 
s m is the log of domestic money supply, and m is the log of domestic money 
stock.
3.3. International Asset Market
One of the key equations of the Dornbusch overshooting model is the uncovered 
interest parity condition. At its basic form, the condition simply claims that the interest 
rate  ) (i on domestic bond must equal the interest rate of foreign bond (
* i ), plus the 
expected rate of deprecation of the exchange rate ( ) (e E & ).  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) 
have however shown that the risk premium can potentially be quite large. Given their 
empirical finding, we modify the basic Dornbusch (1976) model by employing the risk 
premium adjusted interest rate parity condition (Equation (5)).
RP e E i i + + = ) (
* & (5)
The expected rate of nominal depreciation ( ) (e E & ) is presented as the spread 
between e (the long-run equilibrium nominal exchange rate) and e (the spot nominal 
exchange rate).
) ( ) ( e e e E - =q & (5b)
Where: q is assumed to be a positive coefficient parameter, i.e.  ). 0 ( q < If e is larger 
(smaller) than e , then  ) (e E & is going to be positive (negative), implying that there will be 13
market expectation for the local currency to depreciate (appreciate).  In the long-run, e is 
expected to converge to e . 
RP is the risk premium variable, where it is assumed to be positively influenced 
by the size of the external debt  (
* F ) of the country. 
*
0F RP a = (5c)
Note:  0 a is a positive coefficient parameter (i.e.  ) 0 0 > a . Hence, the rise in the external 
debt will increase the risk premium. The higher is the parameter ( 0 a ), the larger is the 
risk premium generated by the external borrowing. For simplicity, we assume here that 
(
* F ) is determined exogenously. One may argue that, within the given theoretical 
frameworks, there is a role for 
* F in explaining the size of c (especially on the 
government expenditure side of it (Eq.2)). However, with the exception of few years 
during the early stages of the 1997 financial crises, the annual government expenditures 
have largely been financed by tax revenues (with a possible exception of the 
Philippines). During most parts of the pre-1997 financial crisis, issuances of government 
bonds/debt securities were largely insiginficant in most of the East and Southeast Asian 
countries. Furthermore, a larger share of the government debts for most of these 
countries is associated with domestic debts (IMF (2003)). To be noted, the overall 
message from the theoretical framework will not be affected if we relax the assumption 
of exogeneity for the (
* F ).
3.4. External Debt and Exchange Rate Overshooting
One of the basic findings of the overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976) claims 
that under the presence of short-run price rigidity, a rise in monetary aggregates such as 
the money supply can easily lead to an overshooting of the nominal exchange rate in the 14
short-run. This study extends the original model by looking at the possibility of the 
overshooting of the exchange rate in the short-run when the economy experiences a rise 
in its external debt position.   
To address this pertinent question, we will derive both the short-run and long-run 
equilibrium conditions of the price and nominal exchange rate. From the money market 
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Note in Equation 6, for the sake of simplicity we assume the money market equilibrium 
condition (Equation 4). This assumption does not change any theoretical findings in this 
section.
Substituting equation 2 to equation 1, and set  0 = p & , the short-run equilibrium 












- + = (7)
Next, the long-run equilibrium for the price and nominal exchange rate will also 
be set. In the long-run, the spot nominal exchange rate is expected to converge to the 
long-run nominal equilibrium rate ( e e = ). Hence from the money market and asset 




* F i y m p a l f + + - = (8)
Note from Equation (7), we can also easily derive the long-run price equation from the 
goods market (Equation 9) by setting up  ) ( y y












- + = (9)15
In the long-run, the price levels from both the goods market and the assets 
market are equal. Setting the price equations (8 and 9) equal to each other, we can 




















+ + + = (10)
Now, we can examine the impact of a rise in the external/foreign debt position on 
the short- and long-run nominal exchange rate by going back to Equation 6 and taking 
the partial derivative with respect to














From equation (10), we can also generate the impact of the changes in  ) (
* F on the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate ( ): e







From Equations (5c and 5b), we know that  ) 0 ( q < and  ) 0 ( 0 > a . Thus, we can 
derive two possible outcomes from Equation (11).







































. This could 
be due to a very small ) ( 0 a , i.e. close to zero, or/and due to a very large ) (q . The former 
captures a situation where the external borrowing (or the particular type of external 
borrowing) does not lead to a rise in the risk premium. On the other hand, a large  ) (q
suggests that market players consider the spread between (e ) and (e ), i.e. the size of 16
expected depreciation or appreciation of the local currency, as a significant factor in 
influencing the rate of return of domestic bond relative to that of the foreign bond.  
We can graphically illustrate the overshooting impact of a rise in the external debt 
(Figure 5). By solving for the price level from the money and asset market equation (6), 
the MS curve can easily be derived. It has a negative slope of ( ) lq - . An increase in 
price will result in a higher demand for money (Equation 3). Domestic interest rate will go 
up (given  a stable money supply), and local currency is expected to appreciate (a fall in 
) (e ). 
From the goods market equation (7), we get the positively slope of IS curve. The 
fall in the nominal exchange rate of the local currency  ) 0 ( > De will cause demand for the 
local product to go up (Equation 2). In time, the rise in demand will lead to a rise in price 
). 0 ( > p &  
Let us now assume that the local economy is at the initial equilibrium condition of 
point (A), where price level is at  p , and exchange rate is at  . e The rise in the external 
debt position will increase the risk premium (Equation 5c). Given the rigidity in price in 








a 0 percentage rate (Equation 6). TheMS curve shifts to ) 1 ( MS . The economy arrives 
at point (B) in the short-run, where the price is still at  p , but the exchange rate has 
depreciated to  ). 1 ( e In the long-run, price will adjust and absorb some of the impact of 
the increase in the  *) (F , as indicated in (Equation 8). At the long-run equilibrium point 
(C), the level of price is at  ) 1 ( p and the exchange rate appreciates from its short-run 
level of  ) 1 ( e and settles at  ). 2 ( e In summary, the rise in  *) (F causes the exchange rate 
to overshoot. From Figure (5), we could also conclude that the larger is the increase in 17
*) (F (shown by the size of the shift in the MS curve), the greater the magnitude of the 
overshooting  )). 2 ( ) 1 ( ( e e -
4. Empirics
The main objective of this section is to empirically test the theoretical finding of 
the previous section on the four East Asian currencies, namely the rupiah, peso, baht 
and won for the period of the early 1990s to 2004.  To do so, we need to construct the 
short-run and the long-run equilibrium exchange rates and employ them to estimate the 
size of overshooting experienced by these currencies
Following the theoretical frameworks, we can estimate Equation 6 (for the spot-
rate) and Equation 10 (for the long-run equilibrium rate). However, given the availability 
of the external debts data (only starting 1994 for the debt securities data set for all 
countries), the estimations for the short-run and the long-run exchange rate, with as 
many as six independent variables, run into a degree of freedom problem. In addition, as 
nicely discussed also by Rogoff (2002), formally testing reduced form equations of the 
Dornbusch overshooting model or its extension is “easier said than done” (pg.12). One 
primary problem is with the potential endogeneity of the money supply , price, interest 
rate and external debt in both Equations (6 and 10).
To circumvent the estimation problem, previous studies, discussed in the 
introduction of the paper, have adopted the spot market nominal exchange rate or the 
real and nominal effective exchange rate as the short-run rate. As for the long-run 
equilibrium rate, the use of the forward rate has also been proposed (see Rogoff (2002)). 
However, the quarterly series of the forward rates since late 1980s or early 1990s are 
not available for these currencies. In their study, Cavallo, et.al. (2002) have instead 
arbitrary defined the prevailing 24 months (or 36 months) after a crisis as the equilibrium 18
rate.
6 They conduct a regression on a pool of crisis episodes of 23 countries, including 
those of the Southeast Asian economies, the Latin American countries, South-Africa, 
Russia, and the European countries.   
In the next sub-sections, we will propose theoretically based structural estimates 
of the short-run and long-run nominal effective (and real effective) exchange rates for 
these currencies. Once we generate the short and the long-run rates, the unit-root 
properties of the relevant series will then be evaluated before we continue to the 
autoregressive distributed lag regressions to test for the exchange rate overshooting 
implication of the external debts on the currencies of the four East Asian economies. 
4.1. Long-Run Equilibrium Exchange Rate
4.1.1 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) and Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) Rate.
The main relationship to be examined is the presence of any overshooting impact 




















. Given the fact 
that most these countries are open economies with multiple trading partners, we will 
adopt the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) index instead. The nominal effective 
exchange rate is constructed as the trade weighted sum of the nominal exchange rate of 
the local currency against the top five trading partner countries.
7 These top five trading 
   
6 The study defines a crisis episode based on two categories. First, the local currency 
depreciated at the size of more than 10% in one month, and also has at least depreciated around 
10% during the last 3 months. Second, there was an official peg or crawling peg broken. It is not 
clear to us as to how and why the study chooses the rate around 24 months (or 36 months) 
following a crisis as the equilibrium rate.    
7  Each country has a different list of top trading partners. But the US and Japan are listed among 
the top five trading partners for all of these economies. 19
partners make up more than 75 percent of total trade of the home country. The spot 








where: NEER is the domestic nominal effective exchange rate.  i v is the trade weight 
assigned to each bilateral nominal exchange rate of domestic currency against the 
trading partner  ) (i currency  ) ( i NEX . The weight is trade-weighted, calculated as the 
percentage share ratio of the trade of each partner country  ) (i with the domestic 
economy. The rise in NEX and NEER implies a depreciation of the local currency.
Next, we need to generate the long-run nominal effective exchange rate. To do 















where:  p is the price level of home country.  i p is the price of the trading partner country 
) (i . The price level for the relevant countries is the consumer price index. A rise in 
) (e implies depreciation in the long-run nominal effective exchange rate of the local 
currency. Note the figures for the spot NEER and the PPP rate are shown in Figures 
(6,7, 8 and 9). 
4.1.2 The Real Effective Exchange Rate and The NATREX 
Apart from employing the nominal effective exchange rate, a number of studies 
have also examined the overshooting evidence using the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) (refer to Rogoff (2002) and Cavallo, et.al (2002)). Given the rigidity of the price 20
level in the short-run, both the real and nominal exchange rate have to move in 
proportion in response to the initial change in the foreign/external debt. Hence, the 































) are also applicable for the real exchange rate case (see Rogoff (2002)). 
The spot REER of the local currency is the trade-weighted sum of the real 
exchange rate of the local currency against that of the top five trading partners’ 













i i * = (15a)
Note:  i REX ) ( i NEX is the real (nominal) exchange rate of home currency against the 
currency of the trading partner country  ). (i A rise in  i REX ) ( i NEX implies a depreciation 
of real (nominal) exchange rate of the local currency. v is the trade weight as, likewise, 
discussed in Equations (13 and 14). As in the case of the PPP nominal effective 
exchange rate, we employ the consumer price index for the price variables  i P ( and  ) P .
The long-run equilibrium ) (REER , on the other hand, will be estimated by 
adopting the NATREX approach (Stein (1995), MacDonald and Stein (1999) and Stein 
and Paladino (1997 and 1999)). The basic general equilibrium framework of the 
NATREX theory explains the dynamic of the medium to long-run equilibrium real 
(effective) exchange rate. In the medium-run, external and internal equilibrium conditions 21
are met, while in the long-run it will also be necessary that the net foreign debt plus the 
capital stock reach their steady state levels.
The NATREX  is an equilibrium exchange rate that ensures the balance of 
payment equilibrium in the absence of cyclical factors, speculative capital movements 
and movements in the international reserves, and the GNP is at capacity. In the long-
run, those movements of capital and reserves will average out at zero, hence, the 
excess of national investment over national saving must be entirely financed through 
external / international borrowing. Hence, NATREX is an appropriate tool for estimating 
the long-run real exchange rate model in our study, as it highlights the important 
implication of the external debt on the long-run movements of the real exchange rate of 
a currency. 
In general, there are four endogeneous equations in the basic NATREX model.  
The first one is the current account equation, where the size of current account is equal 
to national saving minus national consumption. The second equation is the uncovered 
interest rate parity condition. In the medium run the NATREX equlibrium real exchange 
rate satifies these two equations or conditions.  The transition to the longer run 
equilibrium is obtained by also considering the dynamics of endogenous fluctuations in 
capital and foreign/external debt. Hence, the accumulations of capital and external debts 
will directly influence investment and saving in the economy, hence the current account 
position.
Three exogenous variables have been listed in the basic NATREX model as the 
fundemantal determinants of the movements / evolutions of the key variables included in 
the four endogeneous equations (namely investment, saving, flows of external debt and 
capital) . The first one is the social consumption variable, often refered to as the social 
thrift or the time preference variable. This variable is the sum of private and government 22
expenditure. Another exogeneous variable is the real productivity rate  ) (PROD . The 
level of productivity affects the current account equation. The role of relative price or 
terms of trade shock  ) (TOT is also important determinant of the medium to long-run 
evolution of saving and investment, which then have final impacts on  the current 
account balance and  real exchange rate. 
Since we are looking at the period of quarter 1, 1990 to quarter 4, 2003 (except 
for Korea where we have data starting at an earlier period of quarter 1, 1985), a crisis 
dummy  ) (Cdummy variable is also included in the model. This variable takes a value of 0 
before the major devaluation of the local currency in mid to early 1997, and a value of 1 
for the post devaluation period. In short, the following estimation model is considered:
t t t t t Cdummy LnPROD LnRGOV LnTOT LnREER e b b b b a + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 (16)
Note:Ln denotes the log-normal form.
We expect the estimated coefficients for the three key explanatory variables to 
be negative. An improvement in the terms of trade  ) (TOT will cause a capital inflow into 
the tradable sector, creating a real appreciation, thus  . 0 0 < b Note the terms of trade 
variable is constructed as the ratio of the unit value of export over the unit value of 
import of the economy.
As noted, the social consumption is the sum of private and government 
expenditure. However, as also shown by Stein and Paladino (1999) for their three 
European countries (i.e. France, Germany and Italy), we find that the fluctuations in the 
government expenditures have contributed more to the overall changes in the social 
consumption. The GDP shares of the private consumptions of these four economies are 
found to be stationary series at its levels, while the GDP shares of the government 23
expenditures are tested to be non-stationary at its levels.
8 Hence to capture the impact 
of the social consumption behavior on the real exchange rate, we only consider the real 
government expenditure ( RGOV ). Furthermore, the changes in ( RGOV ) capture the 
shifts in the domestic fiscal policy regime of each country. An expansionary fiscal policy 
appreciates the real exchange rate in the short-run. However as the current account 
worsens, the real exchange rate will depreciate in the long run. In short, ) 0 ( 1 < b for the 
short-run case and  ) 0 ( 1 > b for the long run .
An increase in productivity  ) (PROD is expected to improve the current account 
position and the improvement can be sustained even in the long run, i.e. ). 0 ( 2 < b Due 
to the lack of data to proxy the productivity rate, we employ GDP per capita series. The 
advantage of using untrended GDP per capita series, is that we are also able to capture 
the possible consequences of the output cycle on the movements of the real (effective) 
exchange rate (Mills and Pentecost, 2001; and Stockman, 1998).
To ensure that there is a potentially long-run relation (or cointegration 
relationship) among the variables in Equation 16. We test the commonly used ADF and 
the KPSS unit-root testing on all the relevant variables for each country case. The 
results show that all of these variables are integrated of order (1) at its levels.
9 Based on 
the cointegration results, we can confirm that there is one cointegration relationship for 





and  3 b
)
), we then generate the NATREX long-run equilibrium real effective 
exchange rate. 
   
8 Based on the 5 percent critical value of the ADF and the KPSS unit-root testing.
9 The unit-root test results for the NATREX variables are not reported in the paper, but they can 
be made available upon request to the authors.24
Cdummy LnPROD LnRGOV LnTOT LnNATREX t t t t 3 2 1 0 b b b b a
) ) ) ) ) + + + + = (17)
In general, the coefficient estimates are significant and have theoretically 
consistent signs, with the exception of the variable  ) (PROD for the case of rupiah and 
won, and for the variable  ) (TOT for the case of peso. Both the REER and the NATREX 
rates for the four currencies are posted in Figures (6c, 7c, 8c and 9c). These figures 
suggest that the four East Asian currencies were overvalued ) ( REER NATREX > during 
the few years before the outbreak of the 1997 financial crises. The Thai baht was the 
most overvalued currency averaging around 11 percent per quarter between quarter 1, 
1995 to quarter 1, 1997. The won, on the other hand, was only moderately overvalued at 
around 3 percent between quarter 1, 1996 to quarter 1, 1997.  Based on the test results, 
the rupiah and the peso were also overvalued at a quarterly average of around 5-6 
percent between quarter 1, 1995 to quarter 1, 1997.
10 As for the post-1997 period, the 
real effective exchange rates of the rupiah, peso and baht, are found to be overvalued in 
2002 and 2003.   
4.2. Overshooting Tests: The Role of External Debts
Based on equation (11), we estimate the size of the real and nominal effective 
exchange rate overshooting by taking the difference between  ). ( t t e e D - D where: 
t e D and  t e D are the quarterly percentage changes in the spot and the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate of the local currency, respectively. Note a positive  t e D or  t e D
implies a depreciation of the spot or long-run equilirbrium rate, respectively.
   
10  Due to the substantial depreciation of the rupiah at the third quarter of 1997, Figures 6a and 6c 
are not able to capture clearly the overvalued rupiah during the years of 1995 and 1996.25
0 > D - D t t e e is for the case of overshooting, when the spot rate depreciation 
(appreciation) is more (less) than the long-run rate depreciation (appreciation). 
Reciprocally,  0 < D - D t t e e is for the case of undershooting. Note, we can also have the 
case of overshooting and undershooting when the spot rate and the long-run rate move 
in the opposite directions. In a nutshell, an overshooting situation occurs  when the spot 
rate of the local currency has weakened further than the long-run fundamentally 
determined equilibrium rate, or the spot rate has not strengthened as strongly as the 
long-run equilibrium rate. The opposite circumstances are true for the undershooting 
cases.
As elaborated previously in section two of the paper, two categories of external 
debts are included in the testing: (1) total external debt claims on the commercial banks 
in the local economy, and (2) total external debt securities issued by local institutions. 
Both series were gathered from the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) database. 
Note here, for the testing we consider the GDP share of the external debts, not the 
actual amounts, as we wish to focus on the relative size of external debts with respect to 
the overall economy.
The Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) testing will be adopted here. We 
also apply the General to Specific approach of Henry (1976) to each of the ARDL 
testing, where only those explanatory variables with significant coefficient estimates will 
be included in the final regressions. To address the possible structural break due to the 
1997 financial crises in East Asia, we introduce the crisis dummy (Cdummy) to the 
ARDL regression. The dummy equals to zero for the period before the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in 1997 and equals to one otherwise.  The following ARDL overshooting 
regression is tested for both exchange rates (NEER and REER) and the two categories 
of external debts.26















where:  ) ( DebSec D and  ) ( TotBnkClm D are the percentage changes in the total GDP 
share of external debt securities and the total GDP share of total external debt claims on 
the commercial banks. y and  r are coefficient estimate parameters and they are both 
theoretically expected to be positive, that is, a rise in the external debt will lead to an 
exchange rate overshooting. m is expected to be positive, as the incidence of 
overshooting should be more rampant during the crisis period.  t e is the error term. Note, 
we add ( ) 1 - D - D t t t e e to capture the adjustment factor where the rate of overshooting (or 
undershooting) at  ) 1 ( - t may contribute to the incidence of overshooting (or 
undershooting) at period  ). (t The coefficient parameter ( 1 b ) can either be positive or 
negative.
The observation period for each country is dictated by the availability of the 
external debt data. At the most we have data from quarter 1, 1990 to quarter 4, 2003. To 
ensure an adequate degree of freedom, two quarters lag are considered for the ARDL 
test.
11 Before we proceed to the actual ARDL testing, the unit-root properties of the 
relevant variables are to be examined first.
4.2.1 Unit Root Testing
It is well known that the data generating process for most macroeconomic time 
series are characterised by unit roots, which puts the use of standard econometric 
   
11 As also shown in Tables (2-5), in general we do not find the estimate coefficients of the 
expalanatory variables at any higher lags (beyond two quarters) to be significant.27
methods under question. Therefore, it is important to analyse the time series properties 
of the data in order to avoid spurious results. To ensure the robustness of the test 
results, two most commonly used unit-root tests are applied here, namely the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the KPSS unit root tests on the relevant variables 
( ), ( t t e e D - D ) ( DebSec D and  ) ( TotBnkClm D ). As opposed to the ADF tests for which the 
test statistic is constructed under the null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary, 
Kwiatkowski, et al., 1992 (KPSS) propose their test procedure in which the null 
hypothesis is stationary. 
Both the ADF and the KPSS unit-root testing confirm that all of the relevant 
variables (the nominal and real effective exchange rate overshooting rates 
), ( t t e e D - D and the changes in the external debts ( ) ( DebSec D and  ) ( TotBnkClm D ) are 
stationary series ---I(0). For the sake of brevity, the test results are not reported in the 
paper.
12
4.2.2 Analyses on Test Results
The ARDL test results are posted in Tables (2-5). Two main findings are worth 
highlighting. First, the coefficient estimates for the parameters (y andr ) are both 
reported to be positive and significant for all the testing conducted, except for the REER 
of the peso. Thus, this implies that the higher is the accumulation of the rate of external 
debts, the more severe is the overshooting of the NEER and the REER of the local 
currencies in these four countries. In short, the empirical results present conclusive 
evidences that the rapid accumulations in one or both groups of external debts prior to 
the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis in these four economies have significantly 
   
12 However they can be made available upon request to the authors.28
contributed to the incidences of overshooting using both the NEER and the REER of the
four local currencies.
Second, the test results also suggest that the overshooting of the Indonesian 
rupiah has been driven largely by the accumulations of the claims on banks. In contrast, 
the role of debt securities is more significant for the cases of peso, baht and won. These 
findings are arguably consistent with the stylized facts presented in Section 2.1 of the 
paper. The growth rates on the claims on bank for Indonesia were significantly higher 
than the rates for debt securities. The opposite trends occurred for the cases of the 
Philippines, Korea and Thailand, where the buildup rates of the debt securities were 
significantly higher than the rates for the claims on banks. 
Third, the test statistics also suggest that the flows of external debts have 
immediate implications on the fluctuations of these currencies, usually within the first lag 
period (three months). In addition, the impacts last for around two lags (six months 
period).
Few more detail analyses should also be discussed here. The two main findings 
are in general very robust. The test results for the NEER and REER are, in general, 
consistent with each other. The diagnostic statistics, including the R
2 statistics adjusted 
for degrees of freedom, the Durbin-Watson (DW), the F-statistics (and its probability), 
and the Engle’s ARCH test for heteroscedasticity, are presented for each regression. 
The F-statistics indicate that the probability is at least 95 percent that one or more of the 
independent variables are non-zero. The Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the serial 
correlations are not a problem in any of the regression results. In addition, the ARCH 
results conclude the absence of heteroscedasticity in general, with a possible exception 
in the case of the NEER of the baht.  Finally, the R-squares range from around 60 
percent for Indonesia to about 30 percent for the case of peso.29
5. Brief Concluding Remarks
As a number of these East Asian economies shift to adopt inflation targeting as 
the main anchor of their monetary policy, the ability to manage the volatilities of the 
exchange rate will largely influence the capacity of the monetary authority in achieving 
its inflation target. Understanding factors influencing the fluctuations of the local currency 
is therefore imperative, especially given the more volatile foreign exchange markets in 
the region after the outbreak of the 1997 financial crisis.     
This study starts with a theoretical framework which explicitly captures the 
hypothesis that external debt accumulations may lead to overshooting. Given the lack of 
official size of exchange rate overshooting of these currencies, we structurally estimate 
the short-run and the long-run equilibrium exchange rates to report the significant 
presence of exchange rate overshooting (and undershooting) of the four key East Asian 
currencies since the early 1990s. The results have shown that the currency has 
unquestionably become more volatile, as demonstrated by the high frequency and 
persistence in the overshooting (and undershooting) of the East Asia regional 
currencies. Based on the frequencies of the overshooting (and undershooting) of the 
NEER and REER, the rupiah and peso were more severely affected than the baht and 
the won.
To provide more insights to the overshooting phenomena, our study examines 
the potential role of external debt in explaining the incidences of exchange rate 
overshooting of those four East Asian currencies. The empirical results have shown that 
the accumulation of external debts in these economies have indeed been partly 
responsible for the increasing incidence and severity of exchange rate overshooting of 
the local currency. What is even more important is that the empirics have also suggested 
that the role of external debts associated with the banking sector has been largely 
responsible for the exchange rate overshooting of the rupiah, arguably, the most 30
severely crisis-effected East Asian currency. In contrast, the role of debt securities has 
been found to be more significant in explaining the exchange rate overshooting of the 
peso, the won and the baht.
Despite the two contrasting results, we can confidently conclude that managing 
and gradually reducing the high GDP share of the external debt should be placed among 
the foremost strategic objectives of the macroeconomic policy agenda of these 
countries. One obvious question is at what level can the external debt over GDP level 
can be considered safe ?  Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) propose that a 
country’s level of debt intolerance can be approximated empirically as the ratio of the 
average of its external debt (scaled by GNP or exports) to an index of default risk 
(determined by its repayment history and history of macroeconomics stability (such as 
inflation)). Their study finds for instance that the annual external debt over GNP of 
Malaysia can increase to as high as 30 percent, but the country remains in what the 
study considers to be a safe level. In contrast, Argentine will stay under the safe external 
debt level only if it can maintain its external debt below 15 percent of its GNP. 
Any process of debt reduction, however, should be observed in a gradual phase, 
and in a manner that is consistent with the overall macroeconomics conditions of each 
economy. Large payments/service of the external borrowings within a short period of 
time will likely imply an unwanted massive cut in vital sources of funds for financing 
domestic economic activities. In turn, this will likely to drive up interest rate and hamper 
the overall growth of the economy. 
As for the global context, our findings support for the recent commitments by the 
members of G-7 countries and the multilateral agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, to cancel around 31
US$55 billion of debt of the world’s most heavily indebted poor countries.
13 Studies by 
Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2002) and Clements, Bhattacharya, and Nguyen (2003) 
suggest that an external debt beyond 30-40 percent of GDP will lower the growth rates 
of the domestic economy. A similar message is found in our study. The rapid 
accumulation of external debts will increase the risk premium and contribute to the rise 
in the domestic interest rate, and an overshooting in the domestic currency exchange 
rate. Eventually the high interest rate and volatility of the domestic currency will debilitate 
the growth of the local economic.  Much-needed debt relief should therefore assist the 
governments of these economies in managing adverse implications of the external 
debts. 
   
13 Press Conference on the 2005 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee with Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and Chairman of the IMFC, and 
Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund , in September 24, 2005
Washington, DC. (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2005/tr050924b.htm).32
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Table 1: The Johansen Cointegration Test Results
Indonesia: REER-CPI






* There is 1 cointegrating equation at 5% Critical Value.
Dummy LnRGOVT LnTOT LnPROD LnREER t t t t 365 . 0 328 . 0 814 . 1 056 . 0 048 . 4 - - - + - =
Std error:                  (0.1539)**            (0.3605)**          (0.1148)**              (0.2018)*
** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%.
Sample Observations= 1990:1-2003:4; and Number of Lags = 4
The Philippines: REER-CPI






* There is 1 cointegrating equation at 5% Critical Value.
Dummy LnRGOVT LnTOT LnPROD LnREER t t t t 498 . 0 586 . 0 348 . 1 257 . 0 141 . 8 + - + - =
Std error:                (0.0714)**             (0.3351)**        (0.1108)**               (0.0367)**
** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%.
Sample Observations= 1990:1-2003:4; and Number of Lags = 136
Table 1: The Johansen Cointegration Test Results (cont’d)
Thailand: REER-CPI






* There is 1 cointegrating equation at 5% Critical Value.
Dummy LnRGOVT LnTOT LnPROD LnREER t t t t 174 . 0 733 . 1 875 . 0 647 . 0 014 . 4 + + - - =
Std error (0.2073)**           (0.3878)**         (0.5786)**              (0.0885)**
** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%.
Sample Observations= 1990:1-2003:4; and Number of Lags = 1
Korea: REER-CPI






* There is 1 cointegrating equation at 5% Critical Value.
Dummy LnRGOVT LnTOT LnPROD LnREER t t t t 083 . 0 835 . 0 034 . 1 205 . 0 423 . 5 - - - + - =
Std error: (0.0196)**            (0.1411)**          (0.1149)**              (0.0386)**    
** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%.
Sample Observations= 1985:1-2004:2; and Number of Lags = 637
Table 2: Test Results for NEER and REER of Rupiah
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)
  t t PPP NEER D - D = 0.187 •DebSect + 0.622 •TotBnkClmt
    (0.101)*                        (0.105)**
 R
2 = 0.67.    DW = 2.16.    Prob(F-stat) = 0.000.    ARCH(Prob) = 0.41
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
  t t NATREX REER D - D = 0.510( t t NATREX REER D - D )t-1 + 0.621•TotBnkClmt  +
    (0.127)**                                            (0.094)**
- 0.554•TotBnkClmt-1 
(0.126)**                   
 R
2 = 0.65.    DW = 2.16.     Prob (F-stat) = 0.000.   ARCH(Prob) = 0.25
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. DW: Durbin-Watson.
Table 3: Test Results for NEER and REER of Peso
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)
    t t PPP NEER D - D = 0.036 Cdummyt +0.144•DebtSect-1 +
(0.018)**                 (0.067)**
0.125•DebtSect-2 +0.191•TotBnkClmt  - 0.034
    (0.059)*                     (0.067)**
   R
2 = 0.33.    DW = 2.185.    Prob(F-Stat)= 0.008.    ARCH(Prob) = 0.62
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
  t t NATREX REER D - D = 1 ) ( 576 . 0 - D - D t t t NATREX REER
 (0.119)*
R
2 = 0.332.    DW = 1.789.   ARCH(Prob) = 0.65
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. DW: Durbin-Watson.38
Table 4: Test Results for NEER and REER of Baht
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)
    t t PPP NEER D - D = -0.054 + 0.411•DebtSect + 0.191•TotBnkClmt +
 (0.017)**  (0.092)**                       (0.073)*
 0.050CrisisDummyt
 (0.020)** 
       
 R
2 = 0.578.    DW = 1.950.    Prob(F-Stat) = 0.0000.    ARCH(Prob) = 0.08
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
    t t NATREX REER D - D = -0.053 + 0.445•DebtSect +  0.131•DebtSect-1 +
 (0.018)**  (0.100)**                       (0.080)*
0.179•TotBnkClmt  +  t Cdummy 050 . 0
    (0.077)**                               (0.022)**
   R
2 = 0.59.    DW = 2.14.   Prob(F-stat)= 0.000.    ARCH(Prob) = 0.14
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. DW: Durbin-Watson.
Table 5: Test Results for NEER and REER of Won
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER)
    t t PPP NEER D - D = 0.503•DebtSect
   (0.094)**                          
       
 R
2 = 0.40.    DW = 2.47.    ARCH(Prob) = 0.28
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
    t t NATREX REER D - D = -0.064 + 0.239•DebtSect-1 + 0.339 •DebtSect-2 
    (0.028)**   (0.114)**                          (0.115)** 
 +0.072CrisisDummyt    
 (0.034)**  
R
2 = 0.24.   DW = 2.31.     Prob (F-stat) = 0.000.       ARCH(Prob) = 0.94
* Significant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. DW: Durbin-Watson.39
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Figure 5: External Debt and Overshooting 
Price Level    
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Note: A rise in  ) (e implies a depreciation of the local currency.44
Figure 6: PPP Rates and NEER for Indonesia
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Figure 6c: REER (CPI) and NATREX for Indonesia
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Figure 8: NEER of Thailand Baht
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